After decades of consensual policy-making where the major stakeholders shared the responsibility for social policy with government, the focus shifted in the 1980s to reform models of individualized and decentralized decision-making. While those earlier health reforms did not succeed directly, they helped to change the political climate and opened the way for new forms of private care that did not previously have much public support.
Next, the paper looks at the changing positions of the main stakeholders in Dutch health care, including managers and organized patient groups. Managers of health insurance and health care services alike adjusted their attitudes and behavior in reaction to-and in anticipation ofannounced health reforms, even when some of that policy was not implemented. And, once such changed behavior became visible and generally accepted, it encouraged governments to change course and to take up reform proposals that were rejected a decade before. Dutch patients and consumers also faced new options and have reacted in quite divergent ways, sometimes initiating and supporting change, sometimes forcing government to reverse its course.
The paper concludes that rather than a dramatic break with the past, the 2006 health insurance reform represents much continuity in the role of government and other actors in Dutch health care. For example, since the abolition of mandatory contracting in 1991, Dutch health insurers no longer have to contract with every health care provider. Insurers, however, have shown themselves reluctant to break off long-standing contractual relations (and face angry reactions from their insured). New providers-in contrast to health insurers, where there have been few newcomers to the market-have entered the market offering substitutes for traditional health services, but thus far they have had limited success. Dutch citizens have shown limited interest for individual consumer choice in health insurance, and the government is quick to act when facing popular dissatisfaction about the consequences of policy change.
The 2006 Health Insurance Law of the Netherlands
The Health Insurance Law (Zorgverzekeringswet or ZVW) of 2006 aims to provide universal health insurance coverage to all legal residents of the Netherlands. It replaced the former public and private health insurance systems, with entitlements that are almost identical to the former social health insurance. Since January 2006, all residents have to take out basic health coverage with one of the forty or so insurers of their own choice. Insurers have to accept any applicant for that basic coverage. Employers collect part of the insurance contribution as earmarked taxation (in 2007, 6 .5 percent of taxable income up to a ceiling of about €30,000, in 2008, 7.2 percent), channeled through the tax department into a central fund that allocates the money to insurers. In order to compensate for risk differences in their portfolio (for example, when they have a relatively high share of elderly or chronically ill patients), insurers receive extra funding for each insured rated as high risk so that, in theory, they will focus less on selecting the most profitable clients. Criteria that count for the risk adjustment are age, gender, disability, pharmaceutical consumption, and other factors. 1 The assumption is that this way, premium levels solely reflect variations in efficiency or quality. For the remaining 50 percent of their income, insurers charge a flat-rate premium directly to their insured. Premiums may differ between insurance plans, but not between individuals who have selected the same plan. The government pays the contributions for those eighteen years old and younger. Low-income families are eligible for fiscal subsidies, and in 2007, 37 percent of the population received such subsidies (CBS 2007) . contributions and tax subsidies, while patients paid €3.9 billion ($5.5 billion) as user fees (less than 10 percent of total health expenditure). On average, insured paid about €1,000 ($1,400) per year for the ZVW directly to their insurer, plus about €1,000 for the income-related contribution for the ZVW and €980 ($1,370) for public long-term care insurance (AWBZ) (MoH 2006) . government presented the model as private, but changed its mind when it realized that such privatization might be unacceptable to Dutch society. It also realized that a fully privatized health insurance system might run afoul of international treaties that impose certain standards for social policy (such as treaties of the International Labor Organization [ILO] , Council of Europe, or European Union [EU] ), for example, the requirement to cover a minimum share of the population by social insurance or to exempt certain services from co-payments. In fact, it is not clear whether the ZVW system is public or private. Some argue that, legally, the system cannot be labeled as social insurance, as it requires all residents to take out insurance but does not automatically register everyone as beneficiary (Maarse 2006) . The only authority to determine the nature of the system is the European Court of Justice, which will only give a formal ruling if and when someone has brought a case to the Court. That has not (yet) happened.
The question of whether the new insurance should be considered public or private is not only semantic. There are large differences in the regulatory regimes of social and private insurance within the European Union. The European Treaty explicitly states that national governments can freely determine the nature of national social policies, for example, choose a National Health Service or social health insurance. The same treaty sets some basic rules for social policy, for example, a minimum share of population to be covered by social insurance.
But within those broader understandings, national governments have freedom to impose rules and regulations. Once they have chosen to shift certain systems to the private market, however, other rules apply. Private (health) insurance and banking face an entirely different legislative regime than social insurance. EU guidelines severely restrict government intervention (for example, in setting prices or allowing collective bargaining) in the private markets. The
European Court has ruled that once governments introduce the freedom for providers and insurers to negotiate the volume and prices of their services, they clearly engage in economic activity and are therefore subject to EU competition law. This legal dichotomy between the public and private sphere has created dilemmas for governments eager to increase competition in social policy as means of improving quality and efficiency: once they shift to the private markets, they can no longer take the lead in setting prices or planning health facilities (and in any case, they cannot favor national health insurers over companies from other EU countries). Another little noticed consequence has been the end of the traditional neo-corporatist bargaining between associations of providers (such as physicians, physiotherapists, or hospitals) and insurers that negotiate on behalf of their members on the regional or national level (Okma 2002) . And finally, the nature of the insurance determines the nature of the funding: when seen as private, the new system leads to a substantial increase in private funding of Dutch health care; when seen as public, the share of private funding has historically gone down (Maarse 2006) . In Dutch economic and social policy, this distinction has always played an important role.
Health Care in the Netherlands: Underlying Principles and Origins
European countries share basic underlying principles and goals of their health policy: universal (or near-universal) access to health services and health insurance, solidarity (sometimes framed as equity or fairness) in sharing the financial burden of illness, and good quality of services (OECD 1992; OECD 1994) . 3 As the major share of health funding is public, cost control has become one of the overriding concerns of governments. Most industrialized nations see patient satisfaction, patient choice, and professional autonomy of physicians as important goals, too.
4 Nonetheless, there is wide variety in the administrative arrangements for the funding and contracting mechanisms of health care. In the U.K., Italy, Spain, and the Scandinavian countries (as well as Canada), the major share of health care funding comes out of general taxation. In Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, social (and to a lesser degree, private) health insurance systems are the main source.
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Germany (since 1994) and the Netherlands (since 1968) have separate population-wide social insurance systems for long-term care. The two countries also share several institutional features of their funding, contracting, and governance. Both systems are a hybrid between the German Bismarck-type employment-related system and the Beveridge model of population-wide health insurance of the U.K. In all countries, patients pay for some services out of their own pocket or face co-payments for other services, but in many cases governments have mitigated the effects of such co-payments by exempting certain groups or setting annual limits on payments.
Apart from the elements Dutch health care shares with other European countries, there are three important characteristics that traditionally have set the system apart: the relatively high share of private funding (at least until 2006, see below), the long tradition of non-government provision of care, and the neo-corporatist style of social policy-making.
Holland's funding model has borrowed heavily from Germany. In 1941, the German occupational forces imposed the Sickness Fund Decree that required certain groups of lowincome wage earners to register with a sickness fund (or, as a literal translation, "sick fund").
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, successive Dutch governments had tried to introduce similar legislation but failed to reach agreement over the governance model or, more precisely, over the question of who would dominate the boards of sick funds: labor unions, employers, and government, or only labor and capital. External imposition of the model (without direct government representation but under tight state control) thus solved the problem.
After the war, the government decided to keep the system in place. However, the management of health facilities remained largely non-governmental, and most general practitioners, dentists, and physiotherapists continued to practice as self-employed health professionals. In contrast to other European countries, Dutch hospitals were never nationalized.
Recent policy shifts in the 1990s and early 2000s-inspired as much by a general ideological preference for market competition as economic conditions-encouraged the expansion of forprofit health care and for-profit health insurance. This does not always sit easily with the traditional not-for-profit organizations. Dutch hospitals and other actors suddenly have had to act like market actors, a role with which they do not always feel comfortable (Rosenberg 2006) .
Third, the arena of social policy in the Netherlands is characterized by its own tradition of neo-corporatist policy making (Lijphart 1968; Hill 1993; Okma 1997a ). In this model, governments share the responsibility for the shaping and outcomes of social policy with organized stakeholders (for example, labor unions, employers, medical associations, other associations of health care providers and insurers, and organized patient groups). Such associations often had a denominational background. The basic assumption of this interaction was a certain hierarchy in responsibilities (labelled as "sovereignty in its own sphere" by Protestants, or "subsidiarity" by Catholics; the latter term is still common in EU politics to indicate a preference for national policies over EU-level decision-making). First, individual families had to take care of their own members, and second, the denominational organizations that most Dutch families belonged to (for example, the Roman Catholic or Protestant radio stations, housing corporations, home care or other welfare organizations) were to provide support. Only when those two levels failed to meet the basic needs of the members would the state step in as a residual safety net.
In the 1950s and 1960s, the health care system expanded through the creation of a wide array of quasi-independent administrative and advisory bodies, with many interest groups formally represented. In those bodies, health insurance agencies and providers of care held a dominant position. Ironically, this form of engagement of all the major stakeholders in the shaping and implementation of social policy-sometimes labelled the "polder model"-was vilified in the 1980s as the main cause of stagnating growth and high unemployment. Critics of the "Dutch disease" (the enormous windfall state income from oil and natural gas that had boosted social spending) observed how the polder mentality was bogging down efforts to cut public spending, loosen up labor markets, and increase the efficiency of the economy. Later, the very same model of corporatist policy-making was heralded as the "Dutch miracle" when, in the early 1990s, economic growth was higher and unemployment lower than in the neighbouring European countries (Visser and Hemereijck 1997) . The system provided veto power to organized interests that enabled them to block or thwart policy proposals they felt detrimental to their status or incomes (De Roo 1995) . In several instances, those organized interests derailed or slowed down planned or announced health reforms. At the same time, the involvement of a wide array of private organizations contributed to the remarkable stability of Dutch politics.
In the 1980s, inspired by debates on a broader reassessment of the Dutch welfare state, 
Dutch Health Reform Efforts of the 1980s and 1990s: Rise and Demise of the "Dekker

Reforms"
In 1987, an expert committee headed by the CEO of Philips Electronics, Wisse Dekker, proposed a major overhaul of the health care system (Commissie Dekker 1987). The committee signaled several problems, such as the fragmented funding system, a lack of financial incentives to consumers, providers, and health insurers to contain the growth of health expenditures or offer good quality care, and rigid regulations inhibiting a more flexible organization of services. In itself, that analysis was not new: earlier reports had also pointed to those weaknesses, proposing to integrate public and private insurance (Okma 1997a ). The Dekker committee proposed an amalgamation of existing funding streams into one mandatory (social) health insurance system for the entire population, covering the risks of both acute medical care and long-term care. It wanted to strengthen the role of sick funds (and private insurers) as third-party payers in health care and to increase consumer choice. 7 The proposals included free choice of health insurer, reduction of the services covered by the mandatory basic insurance, partial replacement of the income-related contributions by (community-rated) flat-rate premiums, and options for insured persons to accept deductibles or coinsurance in exchange for lower premiums. Further, the committee wanted to reduce the role of government by deregulating the existing planning and fee-setting legislation (all but eliminating the role of local and regional authorities in this field).
Basically, the expert group recommended the introduction of an "internal market" within the framework of social health insurance (Schut 1997; Schut and Van de Ven 2005) . This would not eliminate the role of the state in health care altogether, however, as government would determine the coverage of the mandatory health insurance, set the budgets of the health insurers, and monitor health insurance and the quality of health services. But the responsibility for negotiations over the quantity, quality, and prices of health services was to shift to competing health care providers and competing, but not-for profit health insurers, within the framework of social health insurance. These measures increased the room for insurers to negotiate with providers over the volume,
price, and quality of services and to selectively contract with providers.
The aim was to create a level playing field for sick funds and private insurance. The underlying idea was that consumer choice of health insurer combined with selective contracting would create incentives to improve the quality and efficiency of services as well as contain health expenditures.
After the first steps of implementation of the reforms in the early 1990s, stakeholder opposition resurfaced, public support eroded, and the political backing became more and more hesitant (Okma 1997a This insurance system borrows heavily from the earlier Dekker proposals of the late 1980s.
Shifting Decision-making in Dutch Health Care
In contrast to earlier Dekker reform proposals, the 2006 insurance system excludes the services of long-term care insurance. The rules of the game in social policies changed, but the new rules did not replace the old ones. In the early 2000s, illustrating a certain degree of internal inconsistency in policy (perhaps reflecting a somewhat weak belief in the cost controlling capacities of market competition in health care), the Dutch government turned its attention, once again, to a reassessment of the benefit package of social health insurance, setting tight budget controls and de-listing services, and introducing or increasing deductibles, co-payments or user fees and coinsurance (Scheerder 2005) . As in other countries, the introduction or rise of user fees met with fierce resistance, and government regularly reversed measured or excepted certain groups, like the elderly or chronically ill. In fact, the story of efforts to reduce the coverage of Dutch social health insurance reads like a "catalogue of failure" (Maarse and Okma 2005) .
The government thus encouraged providers and insurers to compete but, at the same time, kept tight control over health expenditure and the allocation of public funds. This has created a complicated overlay of governance models based on quite divergent notions of the role of the state and citizens. It has also created managerial dilemmas for Dutch health care providers and insurers. They have to invest in improving services and expanding market shares, but they also face growing uncertainty over future clients and income streams. They have to act as entrepreneurs, but they also have to sit down with governments at the national, regional, and local levels to discuss policy results. They compete, but government also wants them to collaborate with their colleagues in the region and to participate in collective decision-making.
They have to attract and keep their patients and insured, but they also have to please governments and other stakeholders.
Managerial Changes in Dutch Health Insurance and Health Care
Managers in Dutch health insurance have tried different approaches to address these dilemmas In principle, the abolition of the regional monopolies of sick funds in 1991 allowed new entrants into the social health insurance field. In practice, however, it fueled a rapid process of mergers and acquisitions that sharply reduced competition. The number of independent sick funds went down from over sixty in the early 1980s to thirty in 1999 (Okma 2001) . On average, the funds had 300,000 members, but membership ranged from a few thousand to over one million insured. In 1999, there were also about forty private insurers that catered to the remaining 40 percent of the population. In the Netherlands in 2005, after a rapid process of mergers and informal collaboration between public and private insurance, there were forty-three health insurers (both former sick funds as well as private insurers). Many of those operated as part of broader conglomerates. For example, five main health insurance groups (Achmea, VGZ-IZA, CA, Menzis, and Agis) covered 11 million insured, or over 60 percent of the population in that year (Rengers and Van Uffelen 2005) . After further consolidations, the two largest conglomerates, VGZ-IZA and Agis-Menza, covered over 50 percent of the population. The next stage of this development has been the rise of international insurance conglomerates in the European Union that offer both public and private health insurance, a development that is already making an appearance in the Netherlands. But some of the foreign firms that tried their hand in offering health insurance in Holland, for example, the French AXA and the German DKV, soon left the country again.
Uninsured in the Netherlands
The occurrence of uninsured persons has always been a sensitive policy issue in the Netherlands.
Traditionally, this number has been very low. Although the 40 percent of the population who were not eligible for social insurance did not have to take out (private) insurance until 2006, the vast majority had actually done so. Only about 1 percent of the Dutch population was uninsured.
While the new health insurance is mandatory, there are few effective sanctions if a person does not take out insurance. At first, the Health Ministry decided that in case someone without insurance needed hospitalization, he or she would not only have to pay the hospital costs him or herself but would also have to take out insurance on the spot, retroactively, and pay a fine. But that solution did not appear feasible. Under the new system, private health insurers can bar someone who has not paid his monthly premium for over three months. In 2007, the chairman of the national association of Dutch health insurers (Zorgverzekeraars Nederland, or ZN) announced that its members intended to stop covering persons who had not paid their premiums.
To prevent this from happening, the government first considered the creation of a separate risk Others shifted from standardized to customized care, added luxury care, and extended services to become more attractive to patients and health insurers alike. A few providers ventured into new areas of health-care related services, including home care, meals on wheels, or sports clinics.
Like the insurers, providers tried to focus on the most promising market segments by selecting the wealthiest, healthiest, and cheapest groups, and by setting up health clinics to provide rapid access for their employees. Public polls and debates in Parliament reveal strong opposition in Dutch society to such queue jumping or services limited to certain groups. In the late 1990s, the Health Minister announced measures to limit the activities of private clinics and to prohibit preferential treatment altogether. A few years later, however, that opposition seemed to have faded. In fact, the Dutch government considered the rise of private clinics (independent treatment centers, zelfstandige behandelcentra, or ZBCs) as a solution to the problem of long waiting lists as they added to total treatment capacity. Not all of those centers fared well, and after a few years some closed their doors.
Further, Dutch health care providers-like insurers-strengthened their market position by collaborating or even fully merging with other providers. Many hospitals and other health facilities expanded their activities by developing informal networks and engaging in horizontal integration with similar institutions and vertical integration with nursing homes, retirement facilities, and extramural care in their region. 10 In fact, in several cases, such regional collaboration has sharply reduced the number of independent providers, sometimes eliminating competition altogether and thereby also reducing consumer choice. In particular, providers of care for the elderly and mentally ill have shown themselves eager entrepreneurs. In some instances, their activities have led to virtual regional monopolies, defeating pro-competitive government policies. In the field of hospital care, this development created a tension between the contracting role of health insurers (based on the assumption that they negotiate with competing providers over contracts) and efforts of the Health Ministry to encourage regional collaboration between health care service providers (Boot 1998) .
The creation of the internal market in Dutch health care did not lead to a reduced presence of government. On the contrary, there is wide recognition that competitive markets require extensive regulation and supervision to function fairly well. In spite of announced shifts from "supply regulation" to "demand regulation," both categories of government regulation are now firmly in place.
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It is important to note that after the dismantling of the neo-corporatist institutions, the Dutch citizens-like other Europeans-expect government to safeguard access to good quality care and to step in if needed. For example, faced with public discontent over the de-listing of dental check-ups for adults or IVF treatments from the basic insurance, the government rapidly decided to reinstate (part of) those services (Maarse and Okma 2005) . The government also extended its presence in monitoring health care quality, the development of case-based payment models, and the implementation of information technology.
Like other stakeholders, the association of Dutch health insurers has maintained its prominent presence in a wide range of collaborative efforts. In spite of market rhetoric, it has continued to work with government to find a common solution for the problem of the uninsured and other issues. In a political sense, there clearly has not been a major "exit" (Hirschman 1970) from the policy arena in the small country where the leaders of all the main stakeholder groups know each other well and continue to meet regularly.
New Roles for Patients and Consumers in Dutch Health Care
Dutch citizens have taken new roles in health care, too, but this has hardly resulted in "consumerdriven" health care. In the 1990s, since the abolition of regional boundaries of sick funds, almost all of the thirty or so funds expanded their activities countrywide, so that people with social insurance could switch plans. Perhaps those outcomes confirm Herbert Simon's assumptions of "satisficing" behavior: most people limit their choice to the first few alternatives they can clearly comprehend (Simon 1958).
They simply refuse to go much beyond the first option that seems reasonable or they already know well, and they do not have the time to shop around extensively. The bombardment of information provided by government-sponsored or commercial websites, newspapers, specialized journals or other media has not done much to change that satisficing behavior in Dutch health care. Interestingly, the area where consumer action has affected services the most is not acute medical care, but rather long-term care (Okma 1997b) . In this domain, organized patient groups have successfully demanded better quality of services, in particular the "lunatics movement" of psychiatric patients in the 1960s and relatives of mentally retarded patients. The strategy of "voice" (Hirschman 1970 ) has worked well in this area. In other areas, there has been "exit" as well. Since the mid-1990s, the long-term care insurance has offered the option for certain categories of patients to take cash benefits or vouchers instead of services in kind. This has allowed them to contract with providers outside the traditional institutions. Within a few years, those vouchers became very popular. By the end of 2003, over 50,000 patients had actually chosen this option, receiving an average amount of over €20,000 ($28,000) per year. In 2006, the total budget for those vouchers was over €1 billion ($1.4 billion), or about half of the entire budget for home care-while home care organizations offered care to over 600,000 persons Another factor explaining the high degree of continuity in Dutch health politics is the permanent presence of multi-party coalitions that impose restraints on changes in social policy.
Since the early twentieth century, none of the main political parties has ever been large enough to govern by itself. There is always need for a coalition with others, and changes in political Some of the elements of the new model, for example, the principle of individual choice, market competition, and decentralized administration by independent health insurers, seem to appeal to many policy analysts in the U.S. Alain Enthoven of Stanford University, for example, is convinced that "The lesson for America is that this is what we ought to do" (Naik 2007 ).
According to the New York Times, both Switzerland and the Netherlands lead the way for the U.S. as they have increased consumer choice and reduced the role of government in health care (Harris 2007) . But have they?
It is important to note that there are some major differences between the respective U.S.
and Dutch situations. First, even while nominally shifting from "supply control" to "demand control," the Dutch government still plays a major role in health care and is quick to act when outcomes are seen as unfair. Second, the starting position of the health insurance market was and is dramatically different. Dutch government faces a major political problem when the rate of uninsured threatens to go up from 1 to 2 percent of the population. In the U.S., 16 percent of the population has no health insurance at all and perhaps another 20 percent is underinsured (as we can see in Michael Moore's movie Sicko; see also Marmor, Okma and Rojas 2007) . Even while both candidates for the 2008 presidential election have framed proposals to reduce that number, they have also proposed to expand private health insurance coverage by offering a fiscal subsidy to low-income families. The Dutch experience, on a much smaller scale, shows that offering a fiscal subsidy to low-income groups is not enough to make sure that the most vulnerable groups actually take out health insurance. Third, interestingly, the Dutch experience shows that rather than eliminating the role of employers, the reform has actually strengthened their role, as most now offer health insurance as part of a wider package of employee benefits. In both Switzerland and the Netherlands, the new "private" systems under strict government control have greatly added to administrative complexity-within five years Switzerland reached the peak of health expenditure (after the U.S.) in the world. The first year after the introduction of the new system in the Netherlands, premiums went up on average by about 10 percent. Not quite a success story of cost control by private markets.
It is also important to note that the (partially implemented) health reforms of the 1980s and 1990s did not replace the existing policy directions or governance models in The
Netherlands. Some argue that this has led to a certain degree of "complementarity" of governance models that exist side by side (Helderman 2007) . But it might be more accurate to say that the current landscape of Dutch health care and health insurance reveals a complicated mix of competing and sometimes conflicting notions of public and private governance. The Dutch experience illustrates that health policy-making takes place within the constraints of national traditions, national culture, and national institutions. Government policy interacts with the behavior of the groups affected by that policy. This also means that formally stated policies can differ substantially from actual developments. In several cases, even after passing a formal law, the Dutch government changed actual implementation for a variety of reasons. This confirms the importance of clearly distinguishing announced policy proposals from actually implemented ones. Terms like "policy" or "health care reform" or "consumerdriven health care" are usually not very well defined. 13 Policy proposals that were unacceptable at one time gained support in a later period as some of the main stakeholders had changed their positions and showed anticipatory behavior. The paper shows how announced reforms (even while only partially implemented) and anticipatory behavior by health providers and insurers alike have reshaped the Dutch health care landscape and opened the way for new directions in government policy. 14 Still, new developments are tested against strong popular support for universal access without undue barriers, as well by a strong sense of justice and equality in Dutch society. Both public and private actors feel the restraint of such cultural factors and are quick to assure the Dutch population that innovation will not lead to the erosion of social solidarity.
When facing public outcry over developments that are generally seen as unfair, the government is quick to act and impose restrictions or to reverse its policies.
Notes
1 There has been extensive debate about the selection of distributional criteria for determining the budgets of health insurers (Okma and Van der Burg 2004) . Basically, there are two schools of thought on this matter. The first emphasizes the need for a robust system, not easy to manipulate by any one of the stakeholders, feasible and not too complicated or expensive to run. The other "school" emphasizes the need for allocation that accurately reflects the risk profile of the portfolio of each insurer, thus preferring a more elaborate range of criteria that include disability and other specific illness-related criteria. Adding allocation criteria improves the outcome of the model, but it also adds greatly to the (administrative) costs and it reduces the financial risks for insurers. One interesting question is whether the extension of the model with health-related criteria, in fact, duplicates measurement efforts as the same data count for establishing the casebased payment for hospital care (the "diagnosis-treatment groups").
2 For the purpose of the basic health insurance, almost 40 percent of Dutch families qualify as "low-income" and are eligible for tax subsidy. For the administration of this subsidy, the Tax Department had hired over six hundred staff to check the incomes of the recipients every month. In 2007, the Ministry of Health announced it would simplify the procedures to reduce the administrative burden.
3 In the context of health insurance, the term "solidarity"-often taken as "equity"-has different meanings. It generally refers to the sharing of the financial burden of health insurance. In a narrow (most common and least questioned) sense, equity means that everybody faces the same burden, and has access to medical services when he or she needs them. The measure for "the same burden" usually is taken as the same share of family income; thus, proportional tax is fully equal, while community-rated flat premiums are regressive as higher income groups pay a lower share of their incomes than people with lower incomes. Another meaning of "equity", however, takes equity as a common sense notion of the absence of an insurmountable financial burden for everybody. For example, the early European sick finds charged the same contributions to al their members and offered equal medical services to all. Likewise, until recently, all members of one particular sick fund in Germany paid the same contribution rates (but the rates differed between the funds). The community-rating served as equalization mechanism between the members, not between the funds. In contrast (until 2006) , members of sick funds in The Netherlands all paid the same income-dependent contribution. The British NHS gets most of its funding from general taxation. The notion of equity thus depends on the redistributive working of the tax system. Those are three examples of funding mechanisms that in general, were perceived as fair or equitable by the general populations, even while the distributional effects were quite divergent. 4 The notion of "consumer choice" in health care has taken on quite different meanings. For most patients, in most countries, choice refers to their ability to see a physician or other provider of their own choice. In modern day health policy-making, the term often refers to the possibility to sign up with (or to switch) health insurance or health plan of one's own choice. Paradoxically, the increase of the latter sometimes reduces the former: as insured can chose their health insurance plan, they may find that that particular plan has not contracted their regular of preferred provider, say their long-standing family physician or dentist.
5 Even in the U.S., when the amount of tax subsidies to private employment-related insurances is added to Medicare and Medicaid and other public programs, the public share of funding is over 50 percent. 6 Private provision in Europe, generally spoken, includes both for-profit health care facilities and not for profit providers. In North America, the term usually refers to investor-owned clinics and facilities, whereas in Western Europe (and in particular The Netherlands), it assumes nongovernmental actors, both for profit and not for profit.
7 Consumer voice, however, did get the short thrift as the dismantling of the advisory bodies also eliminated the direct representation of patient and consumer groups. In a later stage, there were efforts to channel consumer and patient interests via so-called "regional patient and consumer platforms" under control of provincial authorities to appease the provinces after their loss of control over health care planning. Those "patient platforms", however, never really gained much ground in health care decision-making.
8 Interestingly, the Dekker report itself does not refer to comparative studies of international experience. The staff of the expert committee wrote the report, largely based on internal discussions. Afterwards, some claimed that Alain Enthoven's "consumer choice plan" served as a model for the report. But there is no evidence of such parentage. There is, in fact another, a more likely explanation for similarities between reform proposals in different countries, namely the limited number of options available for any country seeking to combine universal access with efficient management. At the funding side, (earmarked) general taxation and mandated contributions for social health insurance fulfill the requirement of income-related payments that can safeguard universal coverage. At the contracting side, there are three modes: the integrated model of the British NHS, the reimbursement model of private insurance, and long term contractual relations between third payers and providers (OECD 1992; OECD 1994) . Therefore, the search for models that combine universal access to health care, with a fair distribution of the financial burden and increased efficiency of health care, will only come up with a limited number of models. The dominant experience in the 1980s and 1990s was the shift towards the "public contracting model," with public funding and independent health care providers.
9 Actually, the proposal to keep the long-term care insurance separate from the basic universal insurance was part of earlier adjustments of the Dekker reform process. Early 2001, when the First Chamber of Parliament refused to pass the "second stage reform law," the then Deputy Minister Hans Simons presented a new reform bill, with a much narrower scope of entitlements of the universal insurance than his predecessor Dick Dees to appease, without much success, his opponents (Okma 1997a ).
10 Interestingly, this form of vertical integration of hospital care with nursing home and home care occurred in anticipation of the basic health insurance (based on the Dekker proposals) that was to provide coverage for both acute medical care and long term nursing care. It is not yet clear whether providers have to legally "undo" such integrated services after the decision to keep the long-term care insurance AWBZ separate. In 2004, government decided to shift responsibility for those entitlements to local authorities, but in 2007 it announced a moratorium on further change in the long-term care insurance.
11 Those terms are not self-explanatory. Supply regulation refers to government control of the allocation of resources, planning of health facilities, and setting prices (as well as quality supervision). Demand regulation is based on the assumption that individual choice of health plans and providers will lead to an efficient allocation of resources as (competing) health insurers contract (competing) providers on behalf of their insured.
12 A seemingly contradictory consequence of the extended option to switch sick funds was that persons with social insurance now had more choice than private insured who-as in the US--face barriers of exclusion of pre-existing medical conditions or denial of coverage altogether for other reasons. In the private market, this has caused the problem of "job lock" -when people cannot change work for fear of losing their health insurance.
